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   Japanese fertility started to decline below the replacement level since the 
middle of the 1970s and continued its declining trend already for more than a 
quarter of a century.    Since the middle of the 1990s it came to be closer to among 
the lowest levels in the world.  Although demographers in Japan had had keen 
interest into this below-replacement- fertility phenomenon and tried to analyze its 
demographic as well as social and economic causes, the Japanese government 
took “wait-and-see” attitude towards it during the 1970s and 80s.  In 1990 the 
Japanese government, all of a sudden, sharply responded to the “1.57 shock”
1and 
established a special coordinating committee dealing with low fertility issues, 
namely a Committee for Creating a Good Environment for Having and Bringing- 
up Children, in the Office of Cabinet’s Council on Internal Affairs (Atoh, 2002).  
Although a dozen years have been already spent since then for improving social 
environment for childcare, however, Japanese fertility continued to decrease up 
until now. 
   In January 2002, the latest revision of the official population projections for 
Japan was released by the National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research, revealing that Japan would face with hyper-aging and population 
decline at least in the next half a century due to the prospect of persistent low 
fertility (NIPSSR, 2002a).  Such prospects of Japanese population aroused a 
sense of crisis among many politicians and bureaucrats, especially with regards to 
the sustainability of the social security system.  The Prime Minister told last 
spring, it is reported, the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) to 
strengthen “Shosika-taisaku”, that is, measures to cope with low fertility issues.  
But how could a government affect fertility?  What kind of policy options are 
effective for fertility change? 
  A research project, the Comparative Study of Fertility and Family Policies in 
Developed Countries, lasted between 1999 and 2001, sponsored by the Research 
Fund for Welfare Policies from the MHLW (Kojima, 2002).
2  The  purpose  was  to 
derive policy recommendations on low fertility issues for the Japanese 
Government from the comparative analysis of fertility trends and their 
                                                  
1  In 1990, a figure of the total fertility rate in 1989, 1.57, was released by the government, which 
was lower than the lowest figure of TFR, 1.58, in 1966 which had been ever recorded in the 
history of Japanese Vital Statistics.    The popularity of the term “1.57 shock” in Japan is reflected 
in the fact that it was introduced to the Encyclopedia of Families (Kobun-sha Publishing) 
published in 1996 in Japan.   
2 The project was organized and managed by the first author of this paper.  Since he became a 
member of the Evaluation Committee of the Research Fund for Welfare Policies in 2001, however, 
he had to give up nominally the role of the head of this project only for the final year.    Therefore, 
the final report of this project was authored by one of the project members as a surrogate of the 
head of the project.  
  2
background factors and family policies among developed countries.    For pursing 
this purpose, the research team was divided into two groups:  One is a group to 
deal with cross-national analyses of the comparable data from all the developed 
countries and the other is regional research groups to analyze the country-specific 
detailed data within a certain region.  Five regional groups were constructed 
according to geographic location and/or cultural identity, notably language: They 
are (1) Northern European countries(NEC), (2) German -speaking countries and 
Netherlands(GSC), (3) French-speaking countries(FSC), (4) Southern European 
countries(SEC) and (5) English-speaking countries(ESC).
3  Japan was not 
included in these five regional groups because she is culturally and historically so 
unique among the developed countries. 
   This paper came up from the efforts by the first cross-national analysis group 
to collect comparative time-series data on both demographic, social and economic 
factors and family policies.    The aim of this paper is to analyze trends in fertility 
and its proximate determinants, their social and economic background and family 
policies in Japan in an internationally comparative perspective, clarify their 
similarities with and differences from other developed countries and derive, if 
possible, any possible recommendations for the Japanese government from these 
comparative analyses. 
 
蝔腄Fertility, its Proximate Determinants, and its Social and Economic 
Context 
 
1.  Fertility trends 
The Western societies had mostly completed fertility transition from the 
traditional high fertility regime to the modern low fertility regime during 1930’s 
and 40’s, but experienced a long-term baby-boom after the Second World War.  
Their fertility resumed decline since the middle of the 1960s, plunged under the 
replacement level in the 1970s and remained there up to now, though with not a 
small diversity.  On the other hand, Japan completed fertility transition in the 
1950s with much higher speed than the Western societies.    Her fertility remained 
around the replacement level up to the middle of the 1970s, but started to decline 
thereafter and reached 1.33 of the total fertility rate (TFR) in 2001 (NIPSSR, 
2002b). 
Comparing the trends in TFR between 1960 and 2000 among developed 
countries by regional groups (Figure 1), TFR in Northern European countries 
(NEC), French-speaking countries (FSC) and English-speaking countries (ESC) 
showed upswing since the middle of the 1980s and remained relatively higher 
levels, between 1.6 and 2.1.  On the other hand, while TFR in German-speaking 
countries (GSC) remained relatively lower levels, between 1.3 and 1.5, up to now 
with the exception of Netherlands having TFR of 1.7, after it plunged under the 
                                                  
3  Five regional groups were constructed based also on the similarities of fertility trends and family 
policies or welfare policies in general which had been clarified by previous comparative studies 
(Gauthier, 1996; Esping-Anderson, 1990).  Netherlands was included in a group of 
German-speaking countries only because her language is more similar to German than to other 
languages.  
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replacement level in the 1970s, TFR in Southern European countries (SEC) began 
to decline in the 1980s under the replacement level but continued to decline, 
reaching the lowest levels, between 1.2 and 1.5, among developed countries. 
Of course, as is well-known among demographers, as TFR is a period 
fertility measure affected by both “quantum factor” (the effect of changes in the 
level of cohort completed fertility) and “tempo factor” (the effect of changes in 
the timing of childbearing), it may not reflect an appropriate long-term fertility 
level (Bongaarts, 1998).  According to the data from the Council of Europe, 
however, even the estimated cohort completed fertility has started to decrease far 
below two children on average for the cohorts born in 1960s in GSC and SEC 
(Council of Europe, 2001).    Similarly, since the cohort cumulative fertility at age 
35 has decreased continuously for younger cohorts in Japan, the cohort completed 
fertility is expected to decrease much under the replacement level for the cohorts 
born in the 1960s (NIPSSR, 2002b).
4 
It is clear that TFR trends in Japan since early 1980s are very much similar to 
those in GSC and SEC.    Therefore, it is expected that some hints might be given 
with respect to effective measures to cope with low fertility if we could 
understand adequately socio-economic, cultural and policy conditions common to 
Japan and GSC and SEC and those conditions in Japan different from NEC, FSC 
and ESC. 
 
2.  Proximate Determinants of Fertility 
The common demographic determinant of fertility decline since around 1970 
among developed countries including Japan was the postponement of childbearing 
(Lesthaeghe et al., 2000).  The mean age at first birth increased by 2 to 4 years 
between 1975 and 2000, as is shown in Figure 2.  The degree of its increase in 
Japan, 2.3 years, was the smallest among developed countries:  This is partly 
because she was one of the latest childbearing-age countries already in the 1960s 
and partly because she has experienced only a weak upswing of childbearing at 
women’s age of 30s, or the so-called “catch-up” phenomenon, in the 1980s and 
90s.    In fact, countries with TFR increase since the middle of the 1980s, such as 
those in NEC, FSC and ESC, have experienced “catch-up” phenomenon, resulting 
in larger rise in the mean age at the first birth. 
The postponement of childbearing common to most developed countries is 
generally related to the postponement of marriage in the same period.    The mean 
age at first marriage increased by 2 to 5 years among developed countries between 
1975 and 2000, as is shown in Figure 3.    In the same period when later marriage 
and later childbearing continued, however, the proportion of cohabiting couples 
and that of extra-marital births have drastically increased in NEC, FSC and ESC 
(Figure 4).  Notably in NEC, the proportion of extra-marital births increased 
from 4-11% to 39-55% between 1960 and 2000.  In these countries such 
tendency has come to be strengthened that young people first enter into a 
                                                  
4 Completed fertility measured at women’s age of 45 was recorded as between 1.96 and 2.10 for 
the birth cohorts between 1932 and 1955.    Cohort cumulative fertility at age 35 started to decline 
continuously from 1.88 for the 1957 birth cohort, through 1.73 for the 1960 cohort, up to 1.46 for 
the 1965 cohort (NIPSSR, 2002b).  
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cohabiting relationship, have the first baby in it and later enter into a marital 
relationship.    Because of it, the relationship between marriage age and the age at 
the first birth has been weakened among them. 
Whereas the proportions of cohabiting couples and extra-marital births have 
also increased in GSC, SEC and Japan, the proportion of extra-marital births in 
GSC and SEC are much lower than that in NEC, FSC and ESC, 10 to 31% and 4 
to 22% respectively in 2000 and the same proportion in Japan has been much 
lower than that in GSC and SEC, only less than 2% in the year 2000.
5 
The proportion of extra-marital births and fertility levels are strongly and 
positively correlated among developed countries (Figure 5).  It suggests that a 
society which can allow for various family forms, such as cohabitation and 
non-marital couples with children, can have higher  fertility.  The  low  prevalence 
of cohabitation and extra-marital fertility in Japan and SEC might be explained 
mainly by such strong traditional family norms that premarital cohabitation is 
undesirable and only married couples are allowed to bear children.    But their low 
prevalence in Japan may be partly due to such traditional family norm as the 
breadwinner-homemaker family model (Atoh, 2001).  This is because young 
women in Japan are expected to do most household chores even in a cohabiting 
couple, in spite that cohabitation became prevalent in NEC, FSC and ESC because 
of its nature of equal partnership.
6  Therefore, it appears to be improbable for 
cohabiting couples, let alone extra-marital births, to dramatically increase in the 
near future in such countries with strong traditional family and gender norms as 
Japan and SEC. 
 
3.  Economic and Social Background of Fertility Change 
According to an economic theory of fertility, marital fertility decline, or in 
other words, choice of married couples to have fewer children can be explained by 
four conditions: (1) a decline in the utility or the value of children, (2) a rise in the 
direct cost of childrearing, (3) a rise in the indirect (or the opportunity) cost of 
childrearing and (4) a decline in income levels (Leibenstein, 1957; Becker, 1960). 
(1)  The decline in the utility or the value of children is connected with the 
decrease of labor force and security values of children for their parents which is 
brought about by the long-term transition from agrarian and rural societies with 
both more family businesses and less developed welfare policies to industrialized 
and urban societies with both more employees and more developed welfare 
policies. 
This argument may be consistent with the historical trend that people came 
to be less likely to have or want to have a large family with more than three 
children according to various surveys undertaken among many developed 
countries like Japan (NIPSSR, 1998 and 1999; Atoh, 1996).  But the same 
surveys have also persistently revealed that most people think of two or three as 
                                                  
5 According to the latest National Fertility Survey, the proportion of single women aged 20-29 
who were cohabiting was only 1.8 percent in 1997 (NIPSSR, 1999). 
6 The low prevalence of cohabitation in Japan may also be related to the low prevalence of 
female-dominant contraceptive methods, because under this situation women are more exposed to 
the risk of their unwanted pregnancy in a cohabiting relationship (Atoh, 2001).  
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the desired or ideal number of children for them.  They seem to refute the idea 
that children have lost any utility or value for parents in developed societies.
7 
(2)  Has the direct cost of childcare increased relative to income levels among 
developed countries?  Of course, industrialization, urbanization and the rise in 
educational levels brought about, in the long-run, the increase of general living 
cost including cost for childrearing.  But among European states which have 
supported most of the financial cost for public education including national 
universities, it is not probable that the direct cost of childrearing relative to 
income levels has increased much since the 1970s when the college enrollement 
rate has started to increase (Figure 6). 
In contrast, parents have to pay huge money for their children’s education in 
the contemporary Japan where about 40 percent of the same age cohort go to 
universities (NIPSSR, 2002b).  According to various opinion surveys, education 
expenses are the largest factor for Japanese couples to limit their family size (IPP, 
1993; Atoh, 1996).  The total amount of education expenses of one child is 
estimated to be 9.34 million yen in 1998, 2.2 times of the average annual income 
of employed workers, if the child goes to public schools from elementary school 
to university, commuting from his or her parents’ home (EPA, 1993).  If parents 
send their children to private universities and if they live separately from them, 
the amount is estimated to rise to 19 million yen, 4.4 times of the average annual 
income of employed workers.  Therefore, for cross-national comparisons of 
fertility, the direct cost of childrearing, especially educational cost and housing 
cost relative to income levels may explain the part of its variance.
8 
(3)  The rise in the indirect cost or opportunity cost of childcare is closely related 
to the increase of women’s educational attainment and their labor force 
participation.  Between 1960 and the middle of the 1990s, women’s college 
enrollment rates increased from less than 10% to more than 40% among most 
developed countries, with a dramatic increase since the middle of the 1980s 
(Figure 6).  Also, between 1970 and 2000, women’s labor force participation 
rates during main reproductive years increased among all the developed countries 
(Figure 7).  By regional comparisons, NEC, FSC and ESC have been higher for 
both indicators than GSC and SEC.  Japan is among the lowest for both 
indicators. 
Theories of labor economics teach us that higher education leads to higher 
wage potential, which is, in turn, connected with higher employment opportunity 
and higher income.  Therefore, the increase in women’s educational attainment 
and employment should have caused the rise in women’s time cost, that is, their 
opportunity cost of childcare, which should have contributed to fertility decline, if 
other conditions are equal, in many developed countries including Japan.
9 
                                                  
7  In fact, the majority of women of reproductive ages in Japan think, as the value or the benefit of 
having children, that children are fun, they make their family happier, or they make their parents 
mature, according to fertility surveys (Atoh, 1996).  Economists call it utility of children as 
consumption goods. 
8  In such southern European countries as Italy and Spain, housing cost is said to be so expensive 
for young people due to the shortage of cheap rent-houses that it is prohibitive for their marriage 
(Nishioka, 2002). 
9  The Economic Planning Agency of Japanese government compared estimated life time incomes  
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In the year 2000, the cross-national comparison of women’s labor force 
participation rates and fertility shows, however, that both indicators are generally 
high for NEC, FSC and ESC, only labor force rates are high for GSC and both 
indicators are low for Japan and SEC (Figure 8).  Such a cross-national 
relationship which is apparently puzzling from the viewpoint of labor economics 
suggests that, in the first three country groups, although women’s educational 
levels and labor force rates have increased, the opportunity cost of childcare has 
been reduced by changes in “other conditions”, resulting in easier compatibility of 
occupational work with childcare.  In contrast, it also suggests that in the other 
two country groups, SEC and GSC, and Japan “other conditions” have been 
conducive to the relatively higher levels of opportunity cost of childcare, resulting 
in the difficulty of balancing work and childcare. 
  How do relatively low levels of both indicators, women’s work and fertility, 
coexist at the aggregate level in Japan? The main demographic reason for fertility 
decline in Japan has been the rise in the proportion never married in reproductive 
years and, the higher is women’s educational level, the higher is their proportion 
never married (Atoh, 1994).    The proportion of working women aged 25-34 who 
are never married are very high in 2000, 78% for women aged25-29 and 47% for 
women aged 30-34, because about two out of three working women quit their job 
at the time of either marriage or the first birth (Ogawa, 1996).  Consequently, 
those who remained in the labor market, more educated, tend to have very few 
children on average.  That is the reason of the coexistence of relatively low 
levels of women’s work and fertility. 
  What are “other conditions” which help or hinder the compatibility of work 
and childcare?  The first one is conditions of labor market and employment 
policies of companies and companies’ labor unions, such as commuting time, 
work hours, flexibility of daily work hours and companies’ support systems for 
childcare.  Since it is difficult to collect comparable data for these factors from 
various countries, however, we would like to just mention their importance for 
easier childcare of working mothers.  The second is traditional gender role 
relations.  The cross-national comparison of husbands’ share of family works 
including childcare and levels of fertility shows that those countries which have 
higher husbands’ share of family works tend to have higher fertility (Figure 9).  
Japan and Italy are conspicuous in low levels of husbands’ share of family works.   
The time spent by husbands for family matters remained very little, less than 
twenty minutes on average on weekdays, at least for these twenty years in Japan 
(Atoh, 2000a).  The third is family and labor policies of the government which 
regulates companies’ employment conditions, affects the supply of childcare 
services and provides with economic support for childcare and which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
of two types of two-year college graduating women:  One is those who continue full-time jobs 
until the age of 60 and the other is those who quit their jobs at their marriage and resume part-time 
jobs until the age of 60 after five-year leave for childrearing.  The difference between life time 
incomes of both types, that is, the latter having 78% less than the former, was regarded as an 




1.  Concern about low fertility and family policies 
Among only a portion of European countries, such as France and Luxemburg,   
governments have expressed explicitly their interest into fertility aspect of family 
policies, at least officially (United Nations, 2002).  Similarly in Japan, the 
government had not much interest into low fertility up until the end of the 1980s, 
probably because TFR remained among the highest in the developed countries 
until the middle of the 1980s. 
The government of Japan started to take policy responses to low fertility 
issues in 1990, the year of “1.57 shock”, by establishing the aforementioned 
committee in the Office of Cabinet’s Council on Internal Affairs (Atoh, 2002).  
Parental Leave Act was implemented in 1992, in which full-time employees have 
a right to take a parental leave to raise a child below one year old without any 
income compensation.  In 1994 the so-called “Angel Plan” was formulated and 
childcare services were improved and expanded for the 1995-1999 period, 
including the increase of the capacity of public nursery schools, the expansion of 
services of nursery schools, such as infant care, extended hours of childcare, 
temporary or part-time childcare and community childcare support, the 
introduction of after-school care services for elementary school children, 
encouraging kindergartens to render part-time childcare services and the 
establishment of family support centers (MHW, 1998). 
Starting in 1995 parental leave takers came to be given 25 percent of their 
wage and be exempted from paying premiums of the Employees’ Pensions and 
Health Insurance while they are on leave.  In 1999, a New Angel Plan was 
formulated to extend the Angel Plan for another five years and in 2001 parental 
leave benefit was raised to 40 percent of leave takers’ wage and the duration of 
parental leave was extended to three years for government employees and the 
eligible age of child allowance was raised from below 3 years old to 6 years old 
(MHLW, 2002a). 
Japanese Government defined their policy related to low fertility not as a 
pro-natalist policy but as a welfare policy or a policy for improving childcare 
environment, when it revealed policy guidelines related to it in 1991.  This 
attitude may be related partly to the concern that such policies might be identified 
by the public with the pro-natalist policy which was taken by the military 
government in prewar years.  In fact, Japanese Government responded to the 
Enquiry on Population Policies by the Population Division of the United Nations 
in the 1990s in such a way that it was concerned about low fertility but it did not 
take any measures to raise fertility (United Nations, 2002).    This official position 
is identical to such European countries as Italy and Germany.  The public 
opinion seems to support such government approach to low fertility issues:  
About two out of three respondents think that the government should make efforts 
to improve the environment for raising children in several national surveys 
undertaken in the 1990s (Atoh, 2000b). 
Although Japanese Government has introduced a series of policies 
supporting childcare and improved them gradually in the 1990s, fertility has  
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continued to decline, approaching one of the lowest levels in the world. Why has 
fertility continued to decline in Japan in spite of her governments’ efforts to 
improve childcare environment?    For answering this question at least partially, it 
would be needed to evaluate the levels of public childcare support, or family 
policies in general terms, implemented by Japanese government in an 
international comparative perspective. 
Below, two major components of family policies are discussed in turn: (1) 
Policies supporting the compatibility of work and family and (2) policies for 
economic support of childcare. 
 
2.  Policies supporting the compatibility of work and family 
(1) Maternity/Parental leave 
Maternity leave, giving employed women the right to have a certain period 
of leave when they had a baby, had already been established at least in 1960 
among all the developed countries except US and Australia.    Today, there is only 
a small difference in the duration and cash benefit of maternal leave for most of 
the developed countries, around 15 weeks and about 80 percent of their wage at 
the time of childbearing.  Maternity leave in Japan started before 1960 and its 
duration is 14 weeks, close to the average of all the developed countries, but the 
rate of cash benefit is 60 percent, one of the lowest among developed countries 
except ESC (US. DHEW, various years). 
Parental leave, giving mothers or fathers who are working the right to take 
leave for childcare, has become prevalent since the middle of the 1970s among 
most developed countries as working women have increased.  Compared with 
maternal leave, there is much wider difference in the duration and the allowance 
of parental leave among developed countries, from 10 weeks to 3 years for the 
duration and from no allowance to 100% wage compensation for the allowance.  
There are three types of allowances for parental leave: (a) wage compensation 
type, (b) a fixed allowance type and (c) no allowance (Furuhashi, 1993).  
Generally speaking, NEC belongs to (a), FSC and GSC to (b) and ESC and SEC 
to(c).    Japan and Italy belongs to (a). 
Let us compare maternity and parental leave together among developed 
countries in terms of three indicators for them: (a) total leave, namely the 
maximum duration allowed by the law, (b) paid leave, namely the duration 
covered by any type of allowance, and (c) full pay weeks, that is, the result of 
total allowance for the maximum duration divided by weekly payment according 
to wage levels before taking leave (Ruhm et al., 1995).  In the case of a fixed 
allowance type, (c) is calculated by the division of total allowance by the average 
female weekly wage for manufacturing industry. 
Figure 10 shows that there is a tendency that the duration of total leave, paid 
leave or full pay weeks has been extended, with their wider variations, since the 
middle of the 1970s when the parental leave was introduced in many countries.  
By examining these trends by the three types of parental leave, it is found that, 
while such long duration as 2 to 3 years is given for countries of a fixed allowance 
type, about one year seems to be a norm for countries of a wage compensation 
type.  As for “full pay weeks”, whereas they are over 40 weeks for NEC and  
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France (only for children of the third or higher parity), about 20 weeks are 
common for other countries, except ESC (Figure 10-(c)). 
As is already seen, in Japan parental leave was introduced only in 1992, 
much later than other developed countries.  In spite of subsequent revisions for 
raising its allowances, only in 1997 it was enforced upon all the companies 
including small companies of less than 30 employees.  In  addition,  the  actual  rate 
of taking parental leave among female employees having a baby is only 56.4 
percent in 1999 because of unfriendly atmosphere of workplace, the difficulty of 
securing substitute personnel etc. according to a survey undertaken by the MHLW 
(MHLW, 2002b). 
One of important factors deciding the easiness for women to balance work 
and childcare is the extent of men’s involvement into childcare.  It has been 
reported that in many countries which had introduced parental leave the 
proportion of male parental leave takers has remained low levels.  While such 
proportion has remained low in many countries including Japan where it is 
reported to be only 2.4% in 1999 (MHLW, 2002b), however, it has gradually 
increased in NEC, reaching around 30% recently (Tsuya, 2002). 
In many European countries, measures to promote men’s involvement into 
childcare were introduced, related to parental leave:    One is paternal leave, given 
to a father at the time of childbearing of his wife, which has been introduced in 11 
countries.    Its duration spreads over one day to two weeks, with NEC having the 
longest.  The other one is “papa-quota” of parental leave, adopted in two NEC 
(Sweden and Norway), which stipulates that only men can take 4-weeks leave out 
of total parental leave.  In addition, 13 countries have special leave related to 
family matters, such as the care for sick children, with NEC having the longest 
(OECD, 1995; Funabashi, 1998).  In contrast to NEC which have all these 
measures with high income allowances, Japan has none of these measures, so far. 
 
(2) Childcare services 
For two-earner families to return to work after maternal and parental leave, 
they need any type of childcare services.  They may be help by a kinship 
network, especially grandmothers, nursery schools, kindergartens, family 
childcare or babysitters, but the most important ones as policy measures for 
childcare are childcare facilities including both nursery schools, usually keeping 
children for a whole day, and kindergartens, usually keeping children for half a 
day. 
It is difficult to compare among developed countries to what extent 
governments, central or local, are involved in the supply of childcare facilities as 
well as in subsidizing childcare fees because of the difficultly of obtaining their 
comparable data.  Here the enrollment rate for childcare facilities of child 
population, the easiest available indicator, will be compared among developed 
countries (Kamerman, 2000).  There is not so any large difference in the 
enrollment rate of children aged 3 to 6, which is beyond 70 percent for most of the 
developed countries, with three exceptional countries of the rate of 50 to 70 
percent (Figure 11-a).  However, there is a large difference among them, in the 
same rate of children aged 0 to 2, which spreads over 0 to 58 percent (Figure  
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11-b).    Regionally, these rates of NEC and FSC are more likely to be higher than 
those of GSC and SEC, with an ambiguous position of ESC.    The rate in Japan is 
in the middle level, 21%, for children aged 0 to 2, but among the lowest, 52% for 
children aged 3 to 6. 
Looking at the cross-national relationship between the enrollment rate of 
nursery facilities and fertility in Figure 11, the rate for children aged 0 to 2 has a 
weak but positive correlation, while the rate for children aged 3 to 6 has no 
correlation with fertility.  Since the enrollment rate has a lower value if the 
proportion of full-time housewives is higher, it may not necessarily measure the 
extent fulfilling the need for childcare facilities.  But these data may suggest 
roughly that low availability of childcare facilities especially for children aged 0-2 
is connected to low fertility. 
Comparing public measures as a whole to balance work and family by 
regional groups, NEC is the strongest in both maternal/parental leave and 
childcare facilities, FSC is next to it in both indicators and GSC, SEC, ESC and 
Japan are at weaker levels in both indicators. 
 
3.  Economic support for childcare 
Governments in developed countries support families with children by any 
type of financial methods.  Every government is financially responsible for 
providing with public education at least at the compulsory levels.  Medical cost 
for sick children is usually covered by the public medical insurance system.  
There are usually special support programs for single-parent households.  Some 
governments have a variety of allowances and financial support measures for 
families with children.  Here, two major measures to financially support 
childcare which are, more or less, common to most of the developed countries, 
that is, child allowance and income tax exemption, are compared. 
Apart from ESC, all the developed countries have child allowance system 
(US DHEW, Various Years).  There are two types of child allowance:  One is a 
universal system applicable to every child which is common in NEC, FSC and 
GSC and the other is a system with means-test which is common in SEC and 
Japan.  In most countries child allowance covers children aged 0 to around 18 
and it is often extended to higher ages if they become university students.    Figure 
12 shows trends in the ratio of child allowance, for the first child and the third 
child separately, to the average earnings for employees in the manufacturing 
industry.  According to this, the ratio has not improved at least since the middle 
of the 1970s, always less than 5 percent for the first child and less than 10 percent 
for the third child, for most countries. 
Compared to European countries, the coverage of child allowance in Japan is 
very limited because it is applicable only for children aged 0-6, which was 
extended from children aged less than three only in 1999.  The proportion of 
child population aged 0-19 who are eligible for child allowance in 1998 was 
81.4% for Sweden, 78.2% for Germany, 80.2% for UK, whereas it is only 8.8% 
for Japan.  Also the levels of child allowance in Japan are among the lowest in 
the developed countries having this benefit: the ratio of child allowance for the 
first and the third child to the average earnings of workers in the manufacturing  
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industry is only about 1% and 2% respectively. 
In some countries including ESC and Japan, the main means of economic 
support for childcare is not child allowance but income tax exemption.   
Therefore, we need to examine both child allowance and tax exemption together 
in order to compare the total levels of economic support for childcare. 
Table 1 shows the ratios of child allowance, income tax exemption and the 
sum of both to the income of a model family, that is a single-earner family with 
two children: the income is defined as the average earnings of workers in the 
manufacturing industry.    According to this, it is clear that in many countries child 
allowance is the central means for economic support for such model families.    In 
Japan, Germany, Spain, US and Canada, the central means for economic support 
is income tax exemption, but its levels of benefits are not so high as the levels of 
child allowance in other countries.    Comparing regionally the total ratio in Table 
1 among developed countries which spreads over from 0 to 19%, it is the highest 
in FSC, the lowest in ESC, and GSC, NEC and SEC are in-between.
10 
The ratio in Japan, only 2.3 percent, is the lowest among all the developed 
countries, except New Zealand and Greek.
11  Figure 13 shows the trends in the 
total ratio for the model family defined in Table 1 for selected countries.  It is 
clear from this figure that the economic support for childcare in Japan remained 




   In this article the authors tried to evaluate the relative position of fertility 
trends, its demographic, social and economic background factors and family 
policies in Japan in an international comparative perspective.  What kind of 
policy recommendations to the Japanese Government can be derived from this 
endeavour, on the premise that the lowest-low fertility is undesirable for a society 
but policy measures against reproductive health and rights should be excluded? 
(1)    The main demographic reason for fertility decline in Japan is the 
conspicuous rise in the proportion single among women in reproductive years and 
behind it there is an increasing incompatibility of occupational works with 
childcare due to women’s more involvement into gainful employment.  The 
difficulty of balancing work and childcare has been aggravated by the persistent 
traditional gender role system which is reflected in extremely low levels of men’s 
involvement in household chores and childcare.  Such social situation in Japan 
seems to be common to that in Southern European countries (Nishioka, 2002). 
(2)  Family policies have been strengthened in many developed countries to 
balance work and childcare, including maternal/parental leave and childcare 
                                                  
10 France have a unique tax system based on “family quotient” in which families with more 
dependent children are treated more beneficially in terms of income tax than those with less 
dependent children (Calot, 1996).    Since the benefit of income tax is not easily calculated in such 
a system, it is not included for France in Table 1.    Therefore, it is reasonably assumed that French 
families with children have much higher economic benefit than the level indicated in Table 1. 
11 The reason that child allowance in Japan is indicated as zero in Table 1 is that the average 
earnings of workers in the manufacturing industry is higher than the eligible income level for child 
allowance in Japan.    
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services.  Such countries as Northern European countries and French-speaking 
countries which have relatively stronger family policies tend to have relatively 
higher levels of both women’s labor force participation rates and fertility. 
   In Japan parental leave was introduced only a dozen years ago and it was 
improved only recently in terms of income compensation.  Since it is often 
reported that there are some difficulties for employees to take parental leave, it is 
needed for the government to make efforts to strictly enforce Parental Leave Act 
on private companies.  Although the government has extended and improved 
childcare services in this decade, its availability is not yet sufficient especially in 
large metropolitan areas.  Further efforts are needed to reduce the number of 
children waiting for childcare services in these areas.
12 
(3)  To balance work and childcare it will be needed that the traditional gender 
role system will change in a way that men are more involved in family matters, 
especially childcare.  There have been policy efforts especially in Northern 
European countries to encourage men to be more involved in childcare, such as 
paternal leave and “papa quota” of parental leave.  There may be some 
possibility that such policy measures would affect gender role relations in Japan, 
which would result in the easier compatibility of work and childcare. 
(4)  It is not clear that policies supporting childcare economically have 
significant influence on fertility, but France and Luxemburg which have 
emphasized economic support for childcare tend to have relatively higher fertility.   
A level of economic support for childcare in Japan is among the lowest in 
developed countries and educational cost and housing cost for Japanese parents 
are extremely high compared with many European counterparts.  Strengthening 
economic support for childcare in any means will be helpful for reducing the 
direct cost of childrearing, which may be conducive to higher fertility in Japan. 
 
                                                  
12  According to surveys undertaken by MHLW, the number of children waiting for being accepted 
by the public nursery facilities was estimated to be about 25,000 in the whole Japan in 2002 







Figure 1. Trends in the Total Fertility Rate in Developed Countries by Regional Groups.
Source: Council of Europe, 2001, Recent demographic development in Europe
United Nations, Demographic Yearbook
Australian Bureau of Statistics
DEMOGRAPHIC trends 2000
Statistics Canada
National Institute of Populatrion and Social Security Research,
Latest Demographic Statistics,2001/2002.


































































































Source: Council of Europe, 2001, Recent demographic development in Europe
National Institute of Populatrion and Social Security Research,腀 Latest Demographic Statistics,2001/
Figure 2. Trends in the Mean Age of Women at First




























































Source腆Council of Europe, 2001, Recent demographic development in Europe
Office for National Statistics
National Institute of Populatrion and Social Security Research,
Latest Demographic Statistics,2001/2002.
Figure 3. Trends in the Mean Age at Female First
Marriage
















































Source:Council of Europe, 2001, Recent demographic development in Europe
National Institute of Populatrion and Social Security Research,
Latest Demographic Statistics,2001/2002.
Figure 4. Trends in the Proportion of Extra-marital Births










































Figure 5. The Relationship between the Proportion
 of Extra-marital Births and the Total Fertility Rate(2000)


































Figure 6. Trends in the Gross Enrolment Rate for the Level













































Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics
Figure 7. Trends in the Labour Force Participation Rate























































Figure 8. The Relationship between the Labor Force Participation Rate
Source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe 2001, 2001.
腀腀腀腀腀  U.S.DHHS, National Vital Statistics Report, 50-5, 2002.
腀腀腀腀腀  ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 2001.
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Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1995, 1995. 
Figure 9. The Relationship between the Proportion of the Total Work
Hours Spent by Men Which was Devoted to Family Work and the
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Figure 10. Trends in the Duration and Benefits of Maternal/Parental Leave in
Selected Countries.
Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Central Office of Information Britain;
Hara, T. (2000, 2001);  Hiraishi, N. (1973); Kamio, M. (1992); The Foundation for Children's Future(2000);
Kojima, H. (1996,2000); Matsubara, N. (1995); Nakamura, Y. and Ichibangase, Y. (1999);
National Federation of Health Insurance Societies; The Japan Institute of Labour(1996,1998); 
Nishioka, H. (2001); Ministry of Labour; Saitou, J. (1992); Shibayama, E. (1992,1993); 
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Figure 11. The Relationship between Fertility and Childcare Facility 
Enrollment Rate of (a) Children aged 0-2 or (b) Children aged 3-6 (2000). 
 
      (a)  For  Children  aged  0-2. 
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       ( b )   C h i l d r e n   a g e d   3 - 6 .  
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Figure 12. Trends in theRatio of Child Allowance (a) for the First Child and
(b) for the Third Child to the Average Earnings for Employees in 
Manufacturing Industry for Selected Countries .
Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Hara, T. (2000); 
National Federation of Health Insurance Societies;Kondou, I.(1997); 
Saitou, J. (1992,1994); Ohta, Y. (1987); Tsuya, N. (1996); Tanaka, K. (1999)





















































Table1. The ratio of Child Allowance, Income Tax Exemption
           and the Sum of Both to the Average Earnings of Workers in
           Manufacturing Industry: For Single-earner Families
           with Two Children.
Social Security
Child allowances Tax credit Tax allowances Total
Japan 0 - 2.28 2.28
Sweden 8.16 - - 8.16
Denmark 6.67 - - 6.67
Finland 9.77 - - 9.77
Norway 8.36 1.37 9.73
Germany 9.86 9.86
Austria 12.92 4.34 - 17.26
Netherland 7.13 0 7.13
Switzerland 8.22 0.07 8.30
France 6.02 - 6.02
Belgium 10.21 2.58 - 12.79
Luxembourg 15.02 3.98 - 19.00
Italy 9.44 1.73 - 11.17
Spain 3.35 3.35
Portugal 5.05 2.71 - 7.76
Greece 0
United Kingdom 7.02 0 - 7.02
United States - 3.34 2.75 6.09
Australia 3.13 3.13
New Zealand -0 0
Canada - 6.32 6.32
Source: OECD, Taxing Wage 1999-2000
Note:
- indicates that there is no such system.
0 indicates that benefits are zero because the average earmings of workers
  in manufacturing industry surpass the levels of income limitations 
  applicable to either child allowances or tax benefits.






Figure 13. Trends in the ratio of the Sum of Child Allowance and 
              Income Tax Exemption to the Average Earnings of Work
              Manufacturing Industry: For Single-earner Families
              with Two Children.
Source: OECD, The Tax/Benefit Position of Production Workers
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